Scientific Representation and Information

Abstract

In this thesis, I consider contemporary conceptualisations of both (scientific) representation and information, and find that all are inadequate in virtue of endorsing a dualism between conceptualisation 'in' and 'about' the world. Therefore, I first reconceptualise representation as an enacted structural relationship between agent(s), object(s) or artefact(s), and world. Then I differentiated scientific representation from other kinds of representation by reference to the aim of giving the nearest approximation of reality possible. I move on to give a reconceptualisation of information as an enacted structural relationship between agent(s), object(s) or artefact(s), and world. Before arguing that we should synthesise our concepts of representation and information into one concept: informational representation. Finally, I argue that we can differentiate informational scientific representation from other kinds of information representation. And I conclude by discussing perspectivism in relation to questions of truth in the philosophy of science and questions of the nature of information in the philosophy of information.