Why the current debate on (merely) verbal disputes is uninformative and unnecessary
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Master Thesis
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Abstract
In this thesis, I critically examine the current philosophical debate on (merely) verbal disputes. In particular, texts by Carrie Jenkins, David Chalmers, and Eli Hirsch are discussed. It is found that the two purposes of the debate, according to the participants, are (1) to separate 'deep' ontology (which revolves around 'real' differences) from 'shallow' ontology (in which nothing substantial is at stake), and (2) to provide insights into key notions in the philosophy of language (e.g. language, meaning). It is also found that all the participants to the debate use the same procedure to reach their conclusions. It is argued that the combinations of these particular purposes and this particular procedure renders the whole debate uninformative (in the sense that the procedure adds nothing to its input that is relevant for the purposes of the debate) and unnecessary (in the sense that one can already fulfil the purposes of the debate on the basis of the input alone, without applying the procedure).
Keywords
verbal disputes, philosophy of language, metaphilosophy