The Status of the Mind within Neo-Russellian Monism

Abstract

Within this essay, I will be discussing whether Neo-Russellian Monism can deliver a satisfying theory of the mind. This central question was divided in three sub-problems. First, can Neo-Russellian Monism accommodate mental causation? Secondly, can Neo-Russellian Monism explain consciousness? And lastly, is multiple realizability possible on the Neo-Russellian Monist account? At the end of the essay, it will have become clear that Neo-Russellian Monism can accommodate mental causation, but not multiple realizability. Consciousness could not successfully be explained either. Especially the Neo-Russellian Monist failure to explain consciousness is painful, since solving this specific problem is the main goal of the theory. The conclusion is that Neo-Russellian Monism fails to deliver a satisfactory theory of mind.