Europe's energy crisis as an unintended consequence of Ostpolitik: How the maneuverability of German foreign policy became increasingly narrow and eventually deadlocked

Abstract

The Russian invasion of Ukraine prompted Germany to abandon its Ostpolitik foreign policy, which aimed at fostering closer ties with Russia through economic cooperation on the basis of energy agreements. Although Germany has now shifted towards military power and European defense following Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech in February 2022, its alignment with its Western allies has been complex, as evidenced by the tensions surrounding the Nord Stream 2 project. Moreover, Germany’s Ostpolitik significantly contributed to the current German and European energy dependence on Russia. To understand the influence of German energy policy on its adherence to Ostpolitik and the divergence from its allied partners' Russia policy, this study examines three critical junctures represented by the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhhorod gas agreement in 1981, the Nord Stream 1 agreement in 2005, and the Nord Stream 2 agreement in 2015. Employing the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism, the study reveals how these policy decisions, favoring Russian gas, gradually locked Germany into a path dependency. It uncovers a self-reinforcing mechanism within Ostpolitik, where economic interdependencies with Russia consistently took precedence over alternative energy options. Additionally, unintended consequences of the policy gave rise to German-Russian networks across economic, political, and cultural dimensions, institutionalizing Ostpolitik and influencing social perceptions in its favor. Ultimately, the study concludes that Germany’s divergence from its allied partners can be attributed to the persistent influence of Ostpolitik and its self-reinforcing feedback loop, underscoring the evolving nature of the concept beyond a static foreign policy.