Well-functioning, pleasure, and structural freedom

Abstract

This thesis analyses and builds upon the theory of animal ethics put forward in Korsgaard’s book Fellow Creatures by incorporating an analysis of behavior from Merleau-Ponty’s Nature lecture series. It argues that although Korsgaard extends moral standing to all sentient creatures by describing them as passive ends in themselves, her framework does not explain how concrete duties toward animals follow from this claim. In particular, the moral claims she defends concerning practices of causing pain and restricting animal behaviors are not derived from her moral framework. Therefore, the thesis reconstructs Korsgaard’s concept of well- functioning and evaluates its capacity to ground these duties. It is argued that, while well- functioning gives content to the animal good and is able to justify Korsgaard’s moral claims, it is not sufficiently clear how we can promote an animal’s pleasure in our relationships with them, and which behaviors are morally worthy of protection. To resolve these two difficulties, the thesis turns to Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of animal behavior in the Nature lecture series. A close reading of the Nature lecture series and comparative analysis with the notion of freedom put forward in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception reveals that animals can be understood as “structurally free” beings. It is argued that this insight helps understand the relation between pleasure and behavior. The thesis concludes that respecting the good of animals requires supporting conditions in which animals can exercise their capacity for structural freedom, thereby linking Korsgaard’s ethical framework to Merleau-Ponty’s account of animal behavior.