Adaptation Governance under Intra-State Dependence: What the Dutch Central Government Owes Bonaire for Just Climate Adaptation

Abstract

In intra-state contexts of dependence, climate adaptation justice raises questions that cannot be addressed solely by distributive principles. This thesis examines the duties of the Dutch central government regarding climate adaptation towards Bonaire, a vulnerable community that is constitutionally included within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, using the Klimaattafel Bonaire as a focused test case.

The thesis develops a cumulative normative framework. It first establishes a distributive baseline for adaptation duties by integrating responsibility for climate harms, capacity to contribute, and vulnerability as a priority principle on the receiving side. It then examines who should control adaptation resources by assessing epistemic, entitlement, and democratic

legitimacy arguments for recipient control. Applied to Bonaire, this analysis shows that limited civic influence capacity and state implementation capacity constrain claims to substantive local authority over adaptation governance.

The thesis argues that this gap is normatively significant. Drawing on a republican account of freedom as non-domination, it shows how dependence in adaptation governance can become dominating when central actors retain discretionary control over priority-setting and funding without being effectively constrained by channels for local contestation. Finally, a capabilities-based account specifies the duties of recognition and participation, as well as the capability-enabling duties required for non-dominating durable co-authorship in adaptation governance.