How does one coordinate with others? Using computational cognitive models to investigate the emergence of social norms.

Abstract

I investigate whether reinforcement learning models can explain the emergence of social norms in the Volunteer’s Dilemma. A three player version of this coordination game showed that reward structures of the game have an immediate effect on the manifestation of behavioral patterns, precursors of social norms. It is, however, unknown whether and how cognitive mechanisms contribute to the emergence of social norms. I therefore describe how behavioral patterns in the Volunteer’s Dilemma can be explained with simple cognitive mechanisms of individuals. Using two classes of computational cognitive models, based on reinforcement learning, I show that simple state-based learning does not suffice for pattern emergence. Reinforcement of successful future-oriented strategies, however, predicts the same behavioral patterns as found in the empirical data. Further, I show that certain characteristics of learning either support (e.g., realistic propensities), or suppress the emergence of patterns (e.g., altruism).